Numéraire
A Companion to the Atlas

The Chronology

the table in time

a periodic table is arranged by logic, not by history; but the ideas in it arrived in an order, made by people, through a sequence of revolutions

Why it is dated Every other companion shows the table as it stands — finished, timeless, its elements filed by kind. But the elements were discovered one at a time, over three centuries, by people answering their own questions. This is the missing axis: the order in which the table was actually found, and the figures who found it. The dates are real.

seven ages · forty-eight figures · from the first measurers to the economics of inequality
On the order of discovery

The Order of Discovery

A periodic table is arranged by logic, not by history. Mendeleev did not list the elements in the order they were found; he arranged them by their properties, so that the order on the page would reveal a structure in the world. This work has done the same. Its twenty-six elements are grouped by kind — prices, quantities, failures, institutions, aggregates, behaviors — and not one of the companions before this one has had a word to say about when any of them was discovered. The table is a snapshot of a finished science, with the scaffolding taken down.

But the ideas in it were not found all at once, nor in the order they are filed. They arrived over three centuries, made by particular people working on particular problems, through a sequence of upheavals each generation lived through as a revolution: the classical economists building the first system on Smith’s wealth of nations; the marginalists of the 1870s moving value from labor to desire; the neoclassicals assembling the supply-and-demand apparatus; Keynes inventing macroeconomics in the wreckage of the Depression; the postwar formalists turning all of it into mathematics; and the moderns taking up information, institutions, strategy, and the stubborn irrationality of the mind.

This companion restores that axis. Below, the key idea of each element is set into the history of economic thought, in seven ages from the first measurers before Adam Smith to the inequality economics of the present day. Every figure carries verified dates, a single sentence on what they added, and a link to the volume their idea became. Use the filter to light only the figures who built a chosen part of the table, and a second pattern surfaces beneath the first: the failures and the behaviors are largely a story of the last hundred years, while the prices and the quantities run back to the beginning. The order of discovery is not the order of the table — and the distance between them is its own kind of argument.

Jump to an age

Light the figures who built one part of the table

Each figure links to the volume their idea became. Dates verified against current sources; a dash with no end-year marks the living.

I

Before the Classical

to 1776

Before there was a discipline, there were the first attempts to count a nation’s wealth and to trace the circulation of its money.

1623–1687William PettyPolitical arithmetic — the first insistence that a nation’s wealth could be counted at all.the levelthe tax
1694–1774François QuesnayThe Tableau Économique (1758): the economy drawn, for the first time, as a circular flow.the levelthe surplus
1711–1776David HumeThe quantity theory and the price–specie-flow: money, and the level of prices it sets.the moneythe level
II

The Classical School

1776–1870

From Smith’s wealth of nations to Marx’s critique of capital: value, growth, and the great quarrel over who gets what.

1723–1790Adam SmithThe Wealth of Nations (1776): the division of labor and the invisible hand of the market.the wagethe surplusthe rule
1766–1834Thomas MalthusPopulation against subsistence, and the heresy of the general glut.the growththe cycle
1767–1832Jean-Baptiste SaySay’s Law: supply creates its own demand, and gluts cannot last.the cyclethe level
1772–1823David RicardoRent, comparative advantage, and the labor theory of value pushed to its edge.the rentthe sharethe margin
1806–1873John Stuart MillThe great synthesis: production fixed by nature, but distribution a matter of institutions.the sharethe rule
1818–1883Karl MarxSurplus value and exploitation: the price of labor as the site of a hidden contest.the surplusthe sharethe power
III

The Marginal Revolution

the 1870s

In a single decade, in three countries at once, value was relocated from labor and cost to the margin of desire.

1834–1910Léon WalrasGeneral equilibrium (1874): every market in the economy solved at once.the surplusthe rate
1835–1882William Stanley JevonsMarginal utility (1871): value set at the margin of desire, not by labor spent.the marginthe utility
1840–1921Carl MengerSubjective value, and the spontaneous, unplanned origin of money.the utilitythe moneythe choice
1845–1926Francis EdgeworthThe box and the contract curve: the calculus of utility and exchange.the utilitythe surplus
IV

The Neoclassical Age

1890–1936

The supply-and-demand apparatus is assembled and welfare given a calculus — until the Depression forces the invention of macroeconomics.

1842–1924Alfred MarshallPrinciples (1890): the supply-and-demand scissors, elasticity, and consumer surplus.the marginthe surplusthe spread
1848–1923Vilfredo ParetoOrdinal utility, and the efficiency that now bears his name.the utilitythe surplus
1867–1947Irving FisherInterest, present value, and the quantity equation of money.the ratethe moneythe level
1877–1959Arthur PigouWelfare economics, and the tax that makes a polluter pay.the externalitythe tax
1883–1950Joseph SchumpeterInnovation and creative destruction: growth as a gale, not a glide.the growththe power
1883–1946John Maynard KeynesThe General Theory (1936): effective demand, liquidity preference, and the invention of macroeconomics.the cyclethe ratethe level
1885–1972Frank KnightThe line between measurable risk and true, unquantifiable uncertainty.the premiumthe choice
V

The Keynesian & Formal Age

1936–1970

Mathematics arrives in force: general equilibrium made axiomatic, the cycle modeled, choice and strategy formalized.

1904–1989John HicksIS–LM and Value and Capital: Keynes made into a diagram, demand rebuilt without cardinal utility.the cyclethe ratethe utility
1912–2006Milton FriedmanMonetarism and the permanent-income hypothesis: the quantity theory revived.the moneythe levelthe cycle
1915–2009Paul SamuelsonFoundations (1947) and revealed preference: economics rewritten as mathematics.the utilitythe choice
1916–2001Herbert SimonBounded rationality and satisficing: the maximizer as an ideal the mind cannot meet.the choicethe biasthe firm
1921–2017Kenneth ArrowThe impossibility theorem (1951) and the axioms of general equilibrium.the utilitythe surplusthe asymmetry
1921–2004Gérard DebreuThe Theory of Value (1959): equilibrium reduced to its axioms.the surplusthe rate
1924–2023Robert SolowThe growth model (1956): capital, labor, and the residual called productivity.the growththe stock
1928–2015John NashThe equilibrium (1950) in which no player can gain by moving alone.the game
1930–2014Gary BeckerHuman capital, and the economics of discrimination, crime, and the family.the wagethe choice
VI

Information, Institutions & Strategy

1960–1990

A new microeconomics, running alongside the formal age, takes up what the perfect market left out: hidden knowledge, transaction costs, the commons, the rules.

1910–2013Ronald CoaseThe nature of the firm (1937) and the problem of social cost (1960): transaction costs everywhere.the firmthe externalitythe contract
1919–2013James BuchananPublic choice: politics modeled as exchange, the state as no angel.the taxthe rulethe power
1920–2015Douglass NorthInstitutions as the deep cause of why some nations grow and others do not.the rulethe growth
1921–2016Thomas SchellingStrategy, commitment, and the tipping points of coordination.the gamethe norm
1932–2020Oliver WilliamsonTransaction costs and the boundary of the firm: when to make, and when to buy.the firmthe contract
1932–1998Mancur OlsonThe logic of collective action: why the many, with a shared interest, so often fail to act.the commonsthe power
1933–2012Elinor OstromGoverning the Commons (1990): the community as a third path between market and state.the commonsthe norm
1940–George AkerlofThe market for lemons (1970): how hidden quality can unravel a market entirely.the asymmetrythe premium
1943–Michael SpenceSignaling: how the informed pay to prove what the ignorant cannot see.the asymmetry
1943–Joseph StiglitzScreening and the economics of information: the perfect market shown to be a special case.the asymmetrythe spread
VII

The Modern Age

1970–present

Two opposed programs at once — rationality pushed to its limit and pulled apart — beside a new economics of power, finance, and inequality.

1934–2024 · 1937–1996Daniel Kahneman & Amos TverskyHeuristics, biases, and prospect theory (1979): the systematic ways real choice departs from the model.the biasthe choicethe premium
1937–2023Robert LucasRational expectations and the critique: people see policy coming, and the old levers slip.the levelthe cycle
1939–Eugene FamaThe efficient-market hypothesis: prices already hold all that is known.the stockthe spread
1945–Richard ThalerBehavioral economics and the nudge: the default as a quiet instrument of policy.the biasthe choicethe norm
1946–Robert ShillerExcess volatility and behavioral finance: markets that swing far more than the news.the stockthe cycle
1946–Claudia GoldinThe long history of women’s work, and the anatomy of the wage gap.the wagethe share
1953–Jean TiroleMarket power, regulation, and the game-theoretic taming of the firm.the powerthe rulethe game
1967–Daron AcemogluInstitutions, power, and the deep roots of why nations fail.the rulethe growththe power
1971–Thomas PikettyCapital in the Twenty-First Century (2013): the long run of wealth and inequality.the sharethe stockthe rent
What the dates reveal

Logic and History

Two orders lie over the same twenty-six elements. There is the order of the table — logical, synchronic, the elements grouped by what they are — and the order of discovery — historical, diachronic, the elements found one after another by people who could not see the whole. The first is how the work has presented itself on every other page; the second is what this companion restores. Holding the two together is uncomfortable in a way worth sitting with. The table implies a settled structure, fixed and complete; the chronology shows a science still visibly in motion, its newest ages — behavior, information, inequality — barely a lifetime old, and plainly unfinished.

The history also refuses to be a clean march. After Keynes it stops being a relay race, one school handing off to the next, and becomes something closer to several programs running at once, often against each other: in the very same decades, one set of economists pushed rationality to its limit with rational expectations and efficient markets while another pulled it apart with prospect theory and the nudge. The arrangement into seven tidy ages is itself a simplification — a story imposed on a tangle, as any periodization must be. And it carries the standing temptation of all such histories: to read the past as a ladder built to reach the present, each thinker a rung beneath us, when in truth Smith and Ricardo and Marx were answering their own questions, not ours, and would scarcely recognize the table their ideas were eventually filed into.

Which is the last reason the table and the time-line need each other. Read only the table, and economics looks like a finished cathedral, every stone in its logical place. Read only the chronology, and it dissolves into a sequence of arguments with no structure at all. Both are true at once: there is a real order in the ideas, and that order was built, slowly and contentiously, by people in time. A periodic table without a history is a claim that the science is done; a history without a table is a claim that it is only one thing after another. The work has wanted, from its first page, to be neither.

Return to the atlas for the table these ideas became, the constellation for the bonds among them, the properties to weigh them by trait, the compounds for what they form together, the diagonals to read one idea across the table, the objections to hear the case against it, the laboratory to set the models moving, the preface for the argument entire, the guided tour for a curated path, the index to find any name, the measures for the numbers themselves, the cases to see the table at work, the priceless for where it stops, the gaps for what it never named, the first person for how it is lived now, the schools for the traditions side by side, the sources for the works themselves, or the unsettled for the contests still being fought. The table is timeless; the science is not. The argument, which is to say the history, remains open.